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Abstract
The rapidly developing Web environment provides users with a wide
set of rich services as varied and complex as desktop applications. Those
services are collectively referred to as “Web 2.0”, with examples such as
Google Docs, Wikipedia, Wordpress or Flickr, that allow users to create,
manage and share their content online. By switching from desktop appli-
cations to their Web equivalents more and more data gets released online.
It is the user who creates data, who shares and disseminates this data,
and who accesses it.
Storing and sharing resources over a highly collaborative “Web 2.0”
environment poses new security challenges. Access control, in particular,
is currently poorly addressed in such an environment and is not well suited
to the increasing amount of resources that is available online. We propose
a novel approach to access control for the Web. Our approach puts a user
in full control of their resources which may be scattered across multiple
Web applications. Unlike existing authorisation systems, it relies on a
user’s centrally located security requirements for those resources.
In this paper we present a set of use cases that could be addressed
with our User-Centric Access Control approach. We discuss those use
case scenarios from the perspective of individuals and organisations that
make use of “Web 2.0” applications. We present examples of architectures
that could provide required functionality of each scenario. Additionally,
we discuss those use cases and point out challenges and problems that
require further consideration.
1 Introduction
In contrast to desktop systems, the “Web 2.0” environment does not allow use
of a single access control (authorisation) mechanism, single policy language or
∗Supported by UK Technology Strategy Board, grant nr. P0007E(’Trust Economics’).
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single management tool for various Web applications. Authorisation is often
tightly bound to a Web application and has limited flexibility in terms of its
configuration or adaptation to particular user’s security requirements [33]. Ac-
cess control policies may be composed in incompatible policy languages and are
maintained separately at every Web application. Heterogeneity and distribution
of those policies poses problems in introducing new rules or modifying existing
ones. More advanced custom access control solutions require modifications on
the client side and cannot be easily adopted on a larger scale.
1.1 User-Centric Access Control
Our User-Centric Access Control system is built on the concept of centrally
expressed user’s security requirements that are applied to a user’s distributed
Web resources, as discussed in [34]. Such requirements can be expressed in
form of access control policies. Those policies are stored and evaluated in a
specialised component. We refer to this component as Security Provider (SP).
Web applications are configured to delegate access control to such component
and are only concerned with enforcing access control decisions. Authorisation
is externalised from those Web applications using a well-defined Access Control
API. Such API allows to offload access control decision making process and to
plug in Security Provider’s functionality to the application.
An example architecture of the discussed approach is depicted in Figure
1. Access control is delegated from a Wiki application and an online Storage
Service to a specialised composed - Security Provider. Policies are composed
by a user at SP component side. Each access request to a resource hosted by a
Wiki or Storage Service application is evaluated against applicable policies by
a Security Provider.
Figure 1: User-Centric Access Control for the Web.
A Security Provider allows a user to define access control policies for their
online resources in a uniform way irrespective of the Web application that hosts
those resources. It makes access control decisions based on those policies. It
provides functionality of policy administration and policy decision points, such
as those specified in [26].
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In our proposal a particular Security Provider is chosen and controlled by a
user. We base our concept on that used in OpenID [13] where a user chooses their
preferred Identity Provider according to their requirements and preferences. In
our system such requirements may include available policy languages, policy
editors or policy management tools.
1.2 Interactions
In our system a user interacts with the Web as usual and must only complete
two simple steps of an initialisation phase. At first, a user registers with their
preferred Security Provider. Secondly, a user configures their chosen set of Web
applications to delegate access control for all or part of a user’s resources to this
component.
A user interacts with their Web applications in a usual way by creating new
data or uploading existing data. However, access control policies are configured
on a Security Provider side. This can be done by redirecting user to their
configured provider once a user decides to apply security to their resources.
When a user is redirected then a new policy can be composed or an already
existing policy can be applied to protect a resource.
Access requests to Web resources are performed as usual. When an access
request is received by an application then it issues a query to a Security Provider
to ask if access to a resource should be granted or not. Access control decisions
are made by a Security Provider that uses its policy engine to evaluate access
requests against applicable policies. Those decisions are later enforced by Web
applications.
1.3 Generic Architecture
In its basic form, a User-Centric Access Control system is based on four actors:
User, Security Provider, Web Application and Consumer. Each actor has a
well-defined role within the generic architecture of our proposal as depicted in
Figure 2.
A User is an entity that creates information and makes it available online.
Such information, in form of resources, is hosted by one or more Web appli-
cations. It is typical that a user is involved in offloading authorisation from
their chosen set of Web applications to a specialised component. A user is also
involved in defining access control policies for their resources. In some cases, a
user may only be responsible for creating and submitting resources online and is
not concerned with any access control related tasks. In such cases other entities
are responsible for either offloading authorisation from Web applications (e.g.
by configuring those applications) or by defining access control rules hosted by
those applications. We discuss such settings in our use cases.
A Security Provider provides authorisation functionality for various Web
applications. It acts as a policy administration and policy decision point. A user,
or any other entity responsible for security, needs to configure Web applications
to use a Security Provider for access control purposes. Such entity also composes
3
Figure 2: User-Centric Access Control - Generic Architecture.
policies that are stored within Security Providers. Policies are used by this
component when evaluating access requests that are issued by Consumers and
intercepted by Web applications.
A Web Application needs to be configured to offload its authorisation to
one or more Security Providers. Offloading authorisation can be done on a
per application, per user or per resource basis. In the first approach, an entire
application is configured to use a Security Provider for protection of all its
resources. In case offloading is done on a per user basis then each user is
able to decide which Security Provider best meets his requirements. In the last
approach, each user can additionally decide which resources should be protected
by which Security Provider.
A Consumer issues access requests to resources hosted by Web applications.
Each request is intercepted by enforcement points of those applications and is
subject to access control. Similarly to the access control decision query protocol
defined in [26], access requests are evaluated by a Security Provider and decisions
are returned to enforcement points. A role of a consumer of resources can
be played by any entity on the Web. This includes a human being using a
Web browser to access a resource or a Web application that tries to retrieve
resources from another Web application. An owner of resources (a User) acts
as a Consumer of resources when accessing them.
Apart from the main roles, as depicted in Figure 2, our User-Centric Access
Control system makes use of other services. This includes Identity Providers
(IdP) and other services that can be used to obtain Consumer attributes (such as
user identities and other arbitrary attributes) and services used for obligations
(i.e. actions to be performed during enforcement of access control decisions).
In the next section we present a set of investigated use cases for our User-
Centric Access Control system. Each use case provides an insight into a different
setting of the above mentioned actors. We present an architecture for each
scenario and compare it to the generic architecture of our User-Centric Access
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Control system.
2 Use Cases
In this section we present a set of initially investigated use case scenarios where
we find our model of a User-Centric Access Control to be well-suited. We present
use cases where individuals and organisations, which make use of “Web 2.0”
applications, can benefit from our access control system. We discuss possible
incentives for each use case and present a possible scenario with regards to those
incentives. We support each scenario with a diagram of an architecture that
could be used to achieve described functionality. Moreover, we compare each
exemplary architecture to the generic architecture which has been presented in
Figure 2. We discuss advantages of adopting our access control system in each
use case scenario. Additionally, we point out possible issues regarding the use
of our system in each scenario and discuss possible difficulties and challenges.
We discuss the basic use case scenario in Section 2.1 where a single user
is able to plug in a single Security Provider to various Web applications. An
extended version of this scenario, where multiple Security Providers controlled
by a single user are plugged in to various Web applications is presented in Section
2.2. We show how different users can benefit from using different Security
Providers for the same set of Web applications in Section 2.3. We additionally
discuss how a single user can plug in different Security Providers to the same
set of their Web applications in Section 2.4. We discuss what are the benefits
of that as well. Section 2.5 contains a use case scenario where one user allows a
different user to control security over their set of resources. We present another
similar scenario in Section 2.6 where multiple entities are responsible for the
access control decision making process of the same set of Web resources. We
show how a User-Centric Access Control allows users to influence the decision
making process for access requests in Section 2.7. This use case scenario also
presents how obligations could be incorporated into the authorisation process
and what are the possible benefits of that. In Section 2.8 we present a use case
where a user is able to affect access control for only a part of their resources
hosted by a single Web application. We show a scenario where such functionality
may be of particular interest. We discuss how our approach simplifies security
management when resources are moved between Web applications in Section
2.9. In Section 2.10 we present a scenario where a user can play an active role
during the access control decision making process.
2.1 Access Control to Distributed Web Resources
2.1.1 Introduction
The Web environment with its rapidly emerging collaborative “Web 2.0” ap-
plications allows for flexible and convenient creating, storing and sharing of
resources. Functionality of existing Web applications is becoming very attrac-
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tive to even most demanding users who are now willing to abandon some of
their desktop applications for those accessible over the Web.
By allowing users to have more and more of their data hosted on the Web,
new challenges and problems have emerged. Users must control which appli-
cations host which part of their resources and they must ensure that those
resources are protected according to their requirements. With the increasing
amount of resources that are available online, composing policies at each ap-
plication separately is not desirable and highly impractical. Even applications
with highly appealing functionality leave users with little choice in configuring
security to protect user’s resources.
In contrast to desktop systems, the “Web 2.0” environment does not allow
use of a single access control (authorisation) mechanism, single policy language
or single management tool for various Web applications. Web applications of-
ten have built in access control mechanisms which are limited in terms of their
configuration or adaptation to particular user’s security requirements. Such
mechanisms often address only relatively simple use case scenarios where a user
either makes resources public, private or accessible to a predefined set of collab-
orators. Access control rules are specified using distinct, possibly incompatible,
policy languages and are composed using custom management tools separately
at every Web application. As such, users need to learn each access control sys-
tem and are concerned with various non-business related tasks. They lack a
consolidated view of applied security policies over their set of distributed Web
resources. This may eventually result in inconsistencies in such policies.
High distribution of authorisation systems makes access control management
a complex and error prone task as well. Introducing new access control rules or
modifying existing ones is challenging and requires traversing all Web applica-
tions. Additionally, users are often unable to share resources across boundaries
of the Web application. Authorisation rules can be defined for users with iden-
tities controlled by a particular application or for identities from a limited set
of Identity Providers (e.g. OpenID compatible). More advanced access control
solutions, on the other hand, are either possible only within closed environments
(e.g. company networks where all Web applications are controlled by a single
entity) or those solutions require modifications on the client side. In closed en-
vironments all applications are controlled by a single administrative body and
their code can be easily customised to provide the required functionality. Ad-
ditionally, such environments have a limited user base so that modifications on
the client side are often acceptable.
In the next section we present how a User-Centric Access Control can be
used to support a user with management of security for a distributed and het-
erogeneous set of Web resources. We show how a user of popular collaborative
“Web 2.0” applications can benefit from using our approach by offloading autho-
risation from those applications to a specialised component - Security Provider.
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2.1.2 Scenario
Matthew, a 23 year old Computing Science student, is using Web application
on a daily basis. He is very interested in computing and is very happy with
how the Web environment is emerging. He has his personal Web site that is
a centre for his resources that he shares with his friends for various purposes.
Most typically, however, he shares data to collaborate on IT related projects.
Some of those projects are even managed by Matthew himself.
With the increasing amount of resources and consumers of those resources,
Matthew he decides that it is be much better to move all of his resources to
specialised Web applications. Therefore, Matthew reviews types of his resources
and decides he needs to find appropriate applications for hosting pictures, video
clips, presentations and documents. Moreover, he wants to exchange News
Section from his personal Web site with a proper and more functional blogging
platform.
To meet the goals of his undertaking, Matthew sets up accounts on popular
“Web 2.0” applications. He chooses Picasa Web Albums [16] for storing pictures,
YouTube [24] for video sharing, Office Live Workspace [10] for presentation
and document hosting. He also sets up an account on the Wordpress blogging
platform [22] .
Matthew starts using Picasa Web Albums as his personal Web album with
pictures that he wants to share with either his family or his friends. Additionally,
he uploads diagrams into the service to share them within several of his projects.
Matthew familiarises himself with security features of Picasa [17] and defines
simple access control rules for all of his pictures.
Matthew uploads his high quality video clips from his holiday time to a
fast and reliable YouTube service. Moreover, he uploads some of his home-
made presentations. By using a dedicated service, Matthew is worried about
bandwidth or storage. Moreover, he can protect his video clips and make them
available to a predefined set of his friends [25].
In order to store his presentations and documents, Matthew signs up for an
account on Office Live Workspace [10]. He is happy he can access them from
anywhere in the world by using just a Web browser. Most of his documents
are private and are not accessible by other users of the Internet. However,
some documents are related to Matthew’s projects. Therefore, he defines simple
access control rules to allow a restricted access to some of his documents to his
colleagues [11].
To share views on current projects and to discuss different issues, Matthew
starts using the Wordpress blogging platform. He knows about the value of some
of his blog entries and he decides to make blog entries protected. Therefore, each
blog entry has a list of users that can view it and make comments. Matthew
uses the standard Wordpress security mechanism to achieve that.
With the increasing amount of projects that Matthew is involved in, manag-
ing access control for his resources becomes time consuming. Previously, when
Matthew shared resources using his own Web site only, we was able to eas-
ily establish collaboration groups and add permissions so that resources could
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be shared within those groups. However, with resources being scattered across
multiple Web applications, he finds it difficult to manage access control to them.
Whenever he needs to change an access control rule to a set of resources or there
is a new person who should collaborate on a specific project then Matthew needs
to traverse all his Web applications to change access control rules. This often
leads to composing policies that are far from being perfect and require changes
at a later stage.
To solve the problem, Matthew has decides to offload authorisation from his
Web applications to a specialised Security Provider. He reviews functionality
provided by existing SP components to choose the one which meets his require-
ments. As always, he also reads some Web reviews to see whether an advertised
functionality is good enough and what is the reliability of each provider. When
an account is set up on an SP component, Matthew configures each of his Web
applications to delegate access control decision making process to such compo-
nent. Access control functionality can be delegated as all applications, which
Matthew has decided to use, implement an Access Control API which has been
discussed in Section 1.1.
Matthew is very happy with his Security Provider from the first day he
starts using it. A clean and intuitive interface allows him to compose access
control policies with minimum effort. Support for XACML policies is a huge
advantage as well and allows Matthew to define flexible and powerful policies.
He quickly recreates all the necessary authorisation policies by creating groups
for each project separately and assigning appropriate rights. Moreover, he can
easily add new permissions or new members to the groups from a single location.
His access control policies can then be applied to a distributed set of resources
hosted by various Web applications.
Using a Security Provider allows Matthew not only to centralise management
of access control for his resources. He is also able to audit access requests and
spot mistakes or inconsistencies in security policies very quickly. Centralising
policies gives Matthew a consolidated view over his resources as well.
2.1.3 Architecture
The architecture for our User-Centric Access Control for the provided scenario
is depicted in Figure 3.
A user delegates access control functionality from their Web applications
to a specialised component which hosts and evaluates access requests against
access control policies. As such, a user is able to compose policies in a central
location. Such policies are later applied to a distributed set of Web resources.
Decisions made by a Security Provider are later enforced by Web applications.
2.1.4 Discussion
The scenario shows how a user is able to offload access control from their chosen
set of Web applications to a specialised component - Security Provider. This
is the basic setting upon which the idea of a User-Centric Access Control has
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Figure 3: User-Centric Access Control in Collaboration Using Multiple Re-
sources - Architecture.
been built. A user, owner of Web resources, is responsible for both creating
and sharing of those resources. A Security Provider is used for storing and
evaluating access requests against access control policies that are composed
by a user. Decisions made by a Security Provider are then enforced by Web
applications.
View of the actors presented in this scenario with regards to the generic
architecture of a User-Centric Access Control (see Figure 2) is depicted in Figure
4. Presented diagram shows a Security Provider (1), a User (2), a set of Web
applications (3) and Consumers (4).
Figure 4: User-Centric Access Control in Collaboration Using Multiple Re-
sources Scenario - View of the Actors.
A user owns resources hosted by various Web applications. Each Web ap-
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plication offloads access control to a specialised component which is controlled
by a user. Access control policies are stored by this component. A Security
Provider is also responsible for the decision making process. Web applications
issue access control decision queries to a Security Provider. Decisions are made
based on evaluation of access requests against applicable policies and are later
enforced by each Web application.
By externalising access control to a specialised component, a User is able to
define arbitrarily flexible access control policies depending on the functionality
provided by the component and not the application. Those policies can be then
applied to a distributed set of Web resources. A User can compose policies
in their chosen policy language with the use of a preferred policy editor and
management tool. By being able to express their access control requirements
in a central location, a User is able to achieve close to ideal representation of
their actual security expectations. Moreover, a User can be better supported
with audits of applied security policies over their resources. Additionally, a User
is able to apply various access control models depending on the functionality
provided by their Security Provider and not by a Web application.
2.2 Multiple Levels of Access Control
2.2.1 Introduction
With the adoption of Web applications, users are putting vast amounts of var-
ious resources on the Web. Such resources differ in their value to their owners
and their sensitivity. More and more applications allow people to control their
finances, store very personal pictures or create documents with highly confiden-
tial information.
The same user can store funny pictures on the Web and create highly confi-
dential documents and presentations using existing Web applications. To sup-
port security, such a user can often choose to have different usernames and
passwords for applications that are used for storing and managing resources of
different level of sensitivity. Such approach allows a user not to put “all eggs in
one basket” and not rely on a single password. If such password is compromised
for whatever reason then only a subset of a user’s Web applications is not longer
secure.
A similar approach can be adopted with regards to authorisation where users
can sign up for multiple Security Providers and not rely on a single one only.
In the next section we present how a User-Centric Access Control can be used
to allow a single user to apply a differentiated level of security to various Web
applications. A user can review sensitivity of resources and applications that
host those resources. Then, different Security Providers can be used to protect
resources depending on their level of sensitivity.
2.2.2 Scenario
Derek is using Web applications for various purposes. He is very happy with
benefits of having his resources online and with being able to access them re-
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motely from almost any location. Moreover, he can share those resources and
not be bothered with sending them by email. He is not willing to have multiple
copies all over the place and he wants to be share that it’s always the most
recent copy that is accessed by others.
Derek is using YouTube and Picasa Web Albums to store his short video clips
and pictures respectively. He wants to have those short video clips available for
download by some of his friends. After all, most of that multimedia content was
created during either holiday time with his friends or at weekend parties at his
house.
Apart from pictures and video clips, Derek also has other files which are
very important to him as far as their content is concerned. He has documents
and spreadsheets with some financial data stored at Google Docs. Moreover, he
has some of his older documents zipped and stored at Amazon S3 [1]. All those
documents are most commonly accessed by himself and some members of his
family.
In order to better manage security, Derek decides to externalise authorisation
from all of his Web applications. He wants to centralise policy management and
he wants to have a better view on access control rules that are applied to his
Web resources. He revies resources he has and divides them into two levels of
sensitivity. First, he has resources that are of little value - pictures and short
video clips from parties with his friends. He refers to this group as normal data.
Second, he has documents with financial data that should be accessed by some
family members only. He refers to this group as sensitive data.
With two groups of resources, Derek desides not to put “all eggs in one
basket” but to use two Security Providers for access control purposes. To pro-
tect normal data, he decides to set up an account on a free Security Provider
which would allow him to control resources hosted by YouTube and Picasa Web
Albums. However, to protect sensitive data he decides to sign up for a paid
account at one of the most reliable Security Providers he knows of.
With the basic account on a free SP component, Derek is able to define
simple access control rules. He does not have much insight into audit logs as such
functionality is restricted. On the other hand, his SP component responsible
for authorisation of sensitive data allows Derek to compose XACML compliant
policies using a very clean and intuitive graphical interface. Moreover, Derek
has the possibility to audit all access requests and configures his SP component
to send reports to his email address on a daily basis.
With two distinct Security Providers, Derek feels very confident with the
security of his resources. He knows that in case a free Security Provider mis-
behaves or gets compromised then he shall not lose all of his resources (and
definitely not the ones he cares for the most).
2.2.3 Architecture
The architecture for a User-Centric Access Control for the provided scenario is
depicted in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: User-Centric Access Control in Various Levels of Access Control Sce-
nario - Architecture.
A single user can configure different Web applications to offload access con-
trol to different Security Providers. As such, no single Security Provider is
responsible for access control for resources owned by a single user.
2.2.4 Discussion
In this scenario the same user, owner of resources, can use various Security
Providers for access control to different Web applications. A user can create
subsets from the set of his Web applications and can plug in different Security
Providers to each subset depending on the required functionality or other factors
of particular interest for each subset. For example, a user can have a Security
Provider for those Web applications that host sensitive and valuable data and
another Security Provider for the rest of his Web resources.
View of the actors presented in this scenario with regards to the generic
architecture of a User-Centric Access Control (see Figure 2) is depicted in Figure
6. Presented diagram shows Security Providers (1a,1b), a User (2), sets of Web
applications (3a,3b), Consumers (4) and Identity Providers (5).
By offloading access control to mutliple Security Providers from different
Web applications, the user can provide a differentiated level of security for their
Web resources. User’s resources are not protected using a single component.
The optimal number of Security Providers used for access control purposes is
balanced between the ease of use (centralising security) and the required levels
of security for online resources (distributing access control policies and autho-
risation functionality over multiple Security Providers).
Resources can gain value over time and it is possible that their security clas-
sification (as perceived by their owners) will change. In such cases either the
entire application is moved from on subset to another or resources are moved
from one application to another. In both cases, it is necessary to allow multiple
12
Figure 6: User-Centric Access Control in Various Levels of Access Control Sce-
nario - View of the Actors.
Security Providers to communicate with each other. If such providers allow
composing policies using a single policy language and support users with sub-
mitting and extracting policies then an access control policy from one Security
Provider can be simply copied to another Security Provider with minimum ef-
fort. Such policies can then be reapplied to the same set of Web resources. A
use case scenario which presents how a User-Centric Access Control can support
moving resources between Web applications is discussed in Section 2.9.
2.3 Diverse Access Control for Web Resources
2.3.1 Introduction
Various Web applications are being created each day to attract customers with
their new or improved functionality. When more and more people use an appli-
cation then such application becomes more profitable either by using advertise-
ments or its growing user base.
Applications such as YouTube [24], Flickr [4], Google Docs [7] or Wordpress
[22] allow people to submit videos, pictures, documents and create blog entries
respectively. There are various incentives for people to put more and more of
their content online and access it over the Web. Some users do that for their
own convenience while others may do it for collaboration purposes.
In both cases, security of resources that are created and stored online is an
important issue. If Web applications are used for the convenience of its users
then resources simply must be made inaccessible by other users of the Web.
In case a Web application is used for collaboration purposes then resources
should be shared in a way that does not violate any rules imposed by an owner
of resources or some party responsible for security of those resources (e.g. a
custodian). As such, security mechanisms need to be well-understood. This,
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however, has been proved to be a challenging task for most users [29].
Users of Web applications need to be provided with security that is usable
for them. Otherwise, such security is of little value and may have negative ef-
fect on user experience and the overall level of protection of their resources. An
example would be when a user, who does not understand security mechanisms
implemented by the application, defines incomplete or inconsistent security poli-
cies. Such policies may later lead to data leaks.
Therefore, satisfying diverse and often conflicting requirements of security
mechanisms is a challenging task. Providing either very simple and inflexible or
complicated and highly configurable access control mechanisms requires devel-
opers to put much effort into development of those mechanisms for each of their
applications. Even then such security mechanisms may not satisfy requirements
of all potential users. This may result in limited adoption of applications among
those users.
In the next section we present how User-Centric Access Control can be used
to support usage of diverse security mechanisms by a single set of Web applica-
tions. We show how various users can choose their preferred Security Providers
and plug them in to their chosen set of Web applications.
2.3.2 Scenario
Peter is an 18 year old boy interested in new technologies. He often reads all the
latest news about new hardware and software products. He has been reading
about Web 2.0 and got interested in it a while ago. He already has accounts
on the most popular Web sites and uses them to store most of his personal
information. He does that not only for his own convenience but to collaborate
with his peers as well. He is very keen on sharing not only his own documents
but funny pictures, movies and even links to Web sites that he finds interesting.
As Peter submits various resources to the Web and stores various documents
online, he is very concerned with security and privacy issues. He uploads hun-
dreds of his pictures and short video clips. He uses Picasa Web Albums to store
his pictures and YouTube service to store his video clips.
Peter is using a specialised Security Provider for access control for his re-
sources hosted by Picasa and YouTube. His Security Provider is very flexible
and allows him to define access control policies using various policy languages
such as XACML [26] and SecPAL [28]. Access control rules can be defined using
different interfaces as well. Moreover, Peter is able to see how different people
access his resources and can make statistics which resources are of particular
interest to consumers. For his own convenience, he often makes reports based
on such statistics to see whether any abuses occur.
His Security Provider is very flexible in terms of plugging in Identity Providers
as well. Currently Peter has numerous accounts on different social networking
applications. He has created networks of friends at such applications as Face-
book [3] and Orkut [8]. He also has a professional profile on LinkedIn [9]. He
usually shares his pictures and video clips with his friends on Facebook and
Orkut. As far as professionals on LinkedIn are concerned, Peter usually shares
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presentations, documents and blog entries with them. His Security Provider is
able to gather information from all of the above mentioned social networking
applications and use identities from those application in access control policies
for various resources.
Peter has a sister Natalie who is using the Internet for various purposes. She
reads news Web sites and views pictures of her closest friends. She wishes to
upload some of her own pictures from her holiday time. As she made some really
funny video clips, she wants to share them with her friends as well. Unfortu-
nately, Natalie does not know much about Web 2.0 applications. She wants her
brother to help her with setting up accounts at some online gallery and online
video services.
Peter decides to set up accounts for her sister at the same service providers
that he uses. He has created an account at Picasa Web Albums and YouTube.
Therefore, he’ll be able to show her sister how to use those application and
how to best benefit from them. Peter knows that his sister wants to share her
pictures and video clips wisely. However, Natalie does not know much about
security and is far from being proficient in defining access control policies. The
security mechanisms proposed by Picasa and YouTube may not be suitable for
her.
Based on his sister’s knowledge and experience, Peter decides to set up an
additional account for her on a special Security Provider. The Security Provider
allows simple access control rules to be specified with an extremely user friendly
graphical interface. It is possible to drag and drop identities that are retrieved by
this Security Provider from various services and compose access control policies
using those identities. Additionally, the Security Provider uses recommenders
for its access control, i.e. a user is presented with recommendations when defin-
ing access control rules based on previously specified policies [30].
Peter plugs in Natalie’s new Security Provider to Picasa Web Albums and
YouTube. Natalie is happy with being able to control access to her pictures and
short video clips from a central location and she sees how her friends access her
online resources. She is very happy that she can be restrictive in sharing some
of her resources and that access control can be that fun.
2.3.3 Architecture
The architecture for a User-Centric Access Control for the provided scenario is
depicted in Figure 7.
A user is able to plug in a Security Provider that meets their particular
requirements and expectations. Therefore, a single Web application used by
different users is able to use different Security Providers for the access con-
trol functionality depending on the user. A Security Provider is then used to
store and evaluate access requests against policies applicable to distributed Web
resources. Access control decisions are later enforced by Web applications.
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Figure 7: User-Centric Access Control in Support for Diverse Access Control
on the Web - Architecture.
2.3.4 Discussion
This scenario demonstrates the use of User-Centric Access Control to provide
differentiated security functionality depending on the exact requirements of
users - owners of resources. The same set of “Web 2.0” applications can be
used by Internet users and can benefit from security tailored to particular needs
of each user. It is the user who decides what is the best Security Provider which
suits their needs and meets their requirements. In the presented setting, a user
who is an owner of resources, is also a custodian for those resources.
View of the actors presented in this scenario with regards to the generic
architecture of a User-Centric Access Control (see Figure 2) is depicted in Figure
8. Presented diagram shows Security Providers (1a,1b), Users (2a,2b), a set of
Web applications (3), Consumers (4) and Identity Providers (5).
In the presented scenario a more advanced Web user is able to benefit from
a sophisticated and flexible Security Provider. A user is capable of defining
access control policies in their chosen policy language. A less advanced user is
able to plug in a Security Provider that has a user-friendly graphical interface
and supports users with policy composition (e.g. using recommenders). In both
cases users can decide which Web applications should offload access control to
dedicated Security Providers and which applications should rely on their internal
authorisation mechanisms.
2.4 Multiple Security Providers for a Single Set of Web
Resources
2.4.1 Introduction
Increasingly often access to Web resources must be protected with more than
a single access control policy. There are many different incentives for such ap-
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Figure 8: User-Centric Access Control in Support for Diverse Access Control
on the Web - View of the Actors.
proach. A user may wish that multiple Security Providers are configured so
that if one of them gets compromised then others still allow decisions to be
made and communicated to Web applications. A user may also use multiple
SP components to provide fault tolerance and ensure that if one of the compo-
nents is down then others can take its place. As such, resources are not made
unavailable and remain accessible by legitimate consumers. Moreover, Web ap-
plications are increasingly often used to store and manage resources owned and
created by multiple different users. In such cases it is often necessary to allow
all parties to affect security of those resources.
In the next section we present how a User-Centric Access Control can be
used to allow a single user to use multiple Security Providers for a single Web
application. We show what are the benefits of such approach in terms of the
achieved security. Moreover, we present some benefits related to fault tolerance.
2.4.2 Scenario
John establishes a small company to teach young managers on how to be effective
and how to best handle their projects. Not to invest much in his business, John
sets up accounts on easily accessible and relatively cheap services to do his job.
He decides to write documents and create presentations using Google Docs. He
also sets up an account on Amazon S3 in order to keep some of his already
created documents and other resources that he wants to use as his teaching
aids.
John is very concerned with his documents being accessible by unauthorised
consumers. Therefore, he sets up an account on a Security Provider which would
allow him to control access to all of his resources. His chosen Security Provider
is relatively cheap but very promising in terms of provided functionality. John
uses it for access control purposes for his resources hosted by Google Docs and
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Amazon S3. He specifies basic access control policies to restrict access to himself
and his customers. Whenever a new customer appears, he simply introduces
new rules which are later automatically applied to Google Docs and Amazon
S3 services.
Even though he is very happy with his Security Provider, John decides that it
is better if two different components are responsible for security of his resources.
Being a little paranoic, John decides to set up an account on a second Secu-
rity Provider. To make the whole configuration even more reliable he chooses
a provider which geographical location is different from the one of the first
provider. By doing this, he wants to achieve a relatively simple fault tolerant
architecture.
As both Security Providers use XACML to store and evaluate access control
policies, John can easily copy policies from one place to another. Even though
he loses some usability as he has to introduce changes to his policies in two
different places, he is quite happy with what he achieves. He configures his Web
applications to collect access control decisions from all Security Providers. In
case received decisions are inconsistent or even contradicting then an alert is
sent to John’s email account.
After some time John realises how secure and fault tolerant his architecture
is. He is happy that his highly sensitive resources are protected by two inde-
pendent components. Therefore, compromising only one component does not
affect the overall security of his Web resources. With an increasing customer
base and frequently issued access requests to his set of resources, he learns how
important it is to be always able to provision a resource upon customer request.
In cases where one Security Provider is down (due to any reason) an access
control decision can be still retrieved from the remaining Security Provider.
2.4.3 Architecture
The architecture for a User-Centric Access Control for the provided scenario is
depicted in Figure 9.
Figure 9: User-Centric Access Control in Multiple Security Providers for a Single
Web Application Scenario - Architecture.
A single Web application can be configured to use multiple Security Providers
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for the same set of resources. When an access request is issued for a resource
then an application contacts those SP components to obtain an authorisation
decision. Based on the application logic, its configuration or other factors, the
application may decide which decision is enforced in case decisions from multiple
Security Providers are not consistent or even contradicting.
2.4.4 Discussion
This scenario demonstrates how a User-Centric Access Control can be used to
allow different dedicated Security Providers function as access control decision
components for a single Web application. A user is able to plug in numerous
Security Providers to a single Web application. Each Security Provider is then
controlled by either a user or a custodian responsible for security of those re-
sources. In such setting a user may but does not have to be a custodian for
their resources.
View of the actors presented in this scenario with regards to the generic
architecture of a User-Centric Access Control (see Figure 2) is depicted in Figure
10. Presented diagram shows Security Providers (1a,1b), a User (2), a set of
Web applications (3) and Consumers (4).
Figure 10: User-Centric Access Control in Multiple Security Providers for a
Single Web Application Scenario - View of the Actors.
In the presented scenario a single Web application can benefit from access
control decisions made by different components as configured by a user. There
are various possible options of such setting. Those differ in the way access
control decisions are obtained from SP components and how those components
are controlled.
As far as obtaining access control decisions is concerned, a Web application
may contact each configured Security Provider simultaneously and then handle
all received access control decisions. In such setting, a Web application must be
configured properly to handle contradicting or differing access control decisions.
It can do that either by itself or offload such tusk to a third party service. An-
other approach would be when a Web application contacts configured Security
Providers one by one. Such application tries to contact the first configured SP
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component to obtain a decision. If the communication with this component fails
for any reason, another Security Provider is contacted. An application contin-
ues to request an access control decision until such decision is received from any
legitimate (configured) Security Provider.
The benefits of allowing a single user to plug in various Security Providers to
the same Web application are related to security and fault tolerance. As far as
security is concerned, a user does not “put all eggs in one basket” and distributes
their access control policies over various components. If a Web application
enforces access control decisions made by a majority of SP components then if
k out of n SPs are compromised then resources are still protected as long as
k < (n/2). As far as fault tolerance is concerned, then correct access control
decisions are made if at least a single Security Provider is accessible by a Web
application.
As far as being in control of different Security Providers used for a single
Web application is concerned, different entities may be responsible for those
providers. An owner of resources may control a single Security Provider while
a different entity (e.g. a higher-level custodian) can control a different Security
Provider. In such setting a Web application still needs to resolve access control
decision conflicts which may occur more frequently comparing to the setting
where a single user defines access control policies within all Security Providers
used for a Web application.
Another approach which uses multiple Security Providers controlled by dif-
ferent entities is where one provider has policies for resources and another
provider has only restrictions which must be imposed on those policies. This can
be used when a high-level custodian has knowledge about the overall security
which needs to be enforced and an owner of resources has knowledge about their
collaboration requirements and how to best benefit from sharing a resource. We
shall present a use case scenario which clearly states benefits of such approach
in Section 2.6.
In a setting where different entities control Security Providers for the same
Web application then the access control decision making process can be dis-
tributed over multiple entities. One of the benefits of such approach is that a
malicious user cannot change access control rules for a resource if he does not
control the majority of Security Providers configured by the application that
enforces access control decisions. The other benefit is that such setting allows
multiple entities to be responsible for controlling security for resources and im-
pose restrictions on security policies. This is of particular interest where a Web
application enforces access control decisions made by a Security Provider owned
by one entity if such access control decision does contradict the decision made
a different SP component.
When multiple Security Providers are used for a decision making process for
the same application then the application itself needs to know how to handle
contradicting or differing access control decisions. It can enforce decisions as
made by the majority of SP components configured for an application. A user
can also configure the application to handle such decisions in a different way.
An example is when an application may choose to deny access to a resource if
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any of the obtained decisions is a deny decision (implicit deny) or may allow
access if any of the decisions is the allow decision (implicit allow). As such,
the Web application itself becomes more complex and is involved in the final
decision making process.
2.5 Access Control Management Delegation
2.5.1 Introduction
Social networks and other social applications are becoming increasingly impor-
tant for a large part of the society. Young and mature Internet users participate
in social networks and exchange information about their personal or professional
activities. They create connections with friends or other professionals. They
share their personal information and digital content using such applications.
Young people, in particular, have little knowledge about technical complex-
ities of social networks and other social applications. They have little under-
standing about the value of information that they submit and share among their
peers and other users of those applications. Personal information such as age,
sex, telephone numbers or hobbies are often not perceived as valuable. Simi-
larly, other digital content such as pictures, short video clips or documents is
viewed as any other information which can be freely available to other users of
social networks.
In reality, information submitted by users of social networks may be of great
value to third parties. Personal information is often used for advertising pur-
poses or can be abused by malicious users for other purposes. Digital content,
on the other hand, has influence on how a particular individual is perceived by
others, be it employers or peers. As such, restricting access to information is a
necessity and is currently under various research.
Younger users of social networking applications may not be aware of the
above mentioned security and privacy issues. As such, they may expose too
much information to their friends, which is not desirable. To prevent information
leakage, parents often require to have insight into what information is submitted
and shared. They can then restrict publishing of sensitive information. In order
to be able to control information, parents need to be given usernames and
passwords. This, however, is often perceived to be too intrusive for younger
users.
In the next section we discuss how User-Centric Access Control can be used
to support parents with restricting information publishing by their children.
We present how younger users of social networking applications can benefit
from our proposal. With our scenario we show how our approach allows a user
to delegate access control related tasks to other entities that may have a better
understanding of security requirements for their resources.
2.5.2 Scenario
Alice, a 14 year old girl, wants to have an account on a popular social networking
application. She wants to create a network of her friends with whom she wants
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to share pictures and discuss her hobbies. She wants to keep in touch with them
and does not want to be left behind with new technologies that have been used
by her peers for some time now.
When Alice sets up the account at a popular social networking application
she needs to provide various information including her age. The application
detects that Alice is very young. It then informs her that she will need parental
control over all the information that she submits and wishes to share with other
users of the application. What the application means is that Alice will not be
able to control information dissemination by herself but will rely on an adult to
make access control decision. Alice then asks her father Bob for some help with
setting up her account and providing the required parental control functionality.
Bob is happy that his daughter will be able to communicate with her friends
but he is concerned with what information will be released and how this in-
formation might be used by legitimate or malicious users. He knows that the
social networking application has been certified to support parental control and
allows third party access control systems to be used for that purpose.
Bob is already using a specialised Security Provider for his own purposes.
He uses such component to define access control policies for his various online
resources like documents and pictures that he shares with his friends and col-
leagues at work. Bob decides to use this Security Provider for parental control
over Alice’s information. He plugs in this SP component to the social networking
application and is now able to easily control how various information submitted
by Alice is shared among her friends.
When the account is set up then Alice is able to use it just as any other user
of the social networking application. She writes comments about her day, posts
links to interesting movies. Additionally, she uploads some of her pictures and
short video clips with her friends. She knows that her father is very concerned
with privacy and that only comments and links are automatically shared with
her friends. However, pictures and videos are only shared with a predefined
set of her friends which was approved by her father. To extend the set and
share such multimedia content with other users, Alice must ask for her father’s
consent.
Knowing about security constraints imposed by her father, Alice decides to
upload a picture from her birthday party. She wants to share it with all the
friends that attended the party. When the picture is uploaded she clicks a share
button to make a list of friends who should be able to access this picture. Up to
this point, Alice performs sharing related task just as any other user. However,
once the ’Share’ button is clicked then Alice is presented with an information
that her picture has been shared with Tom and Patrick only as those two out
of her list are considered trustworthy by her father. Sharing the picture with
the rest of the group is subject to Alice’s father approval.
Under the hood, the social networking application sends an access control
policy request to the Security Provider as configured by Bob. The picture is
not shared unless a reply is sent back confirming that a policy, as defined in
form of list by Alice, is proper. This policy request awaits within a Security
Provider for Bob’s consideration. As Bob checks his Security Provider on a
22
daily basis, he sees that a new request for an access control policy has been
received. He checks the resource that is shared (i.e. the picture of her daughter
at her birthday party) and what are the possible consumers of this resource
(i.e. identities of her daughter’s friends). The list seems fine for Bob apart
from a single identity of her daughter’s older friend who misbehaved at the
party. Therefore, Bob removes his identity from the list and approves a new
access control policy. When this happens, a request is sent back to the social
networking application that a policy for the picture has changed.
When Alice logs in to her account at a social networking application she
sees that her father approved her sharing list. What that means is that Alice’s
proposed access control policy has been validated by her father and has been
applied to her picture. However, she notices that some identities have been
removed from the list. She checks which of her friends have been removed and
decides not to negotiate with her father. After all, she was mad with her friend
not acting properly at this very important event of hers. She hopes that her
friends will get notifications about a new picture being shared and she is very
excited about the comments.
Over time, Alice learns that allowing her father to have impact on security
of the resources that she shares with her friends is not a bad thing. She feels
safe and knows that everything she submits to her social networking applica-
tion is secure. Over time, Alice also learns more about security and sees what
information is prevented from being shared with her friends. In the future she
hopes to make better security decisions by herself. At some point she’ll be fully
responsible for controlling access to her resources.
Her father Bob is also happy as he knows that his daughter can communicate
with her friends in a safe and secure way. He checks his Security Provider on
a daily basis and composes access control policies if any requests are sent by
his daughter’s social networking application. Moreover, he audits all access
requests and sees how Alice’s friends access her pictures and video clips. He
hasn’t noticed any abuses and is confident in whatever her daughter does. After
all, he’s fully responsible for her privacy and security and he puts much effort
into ensuring that his daughter stays safe and still enjoys the benefits of social
networking on the Web.
2.5.3 Architecture
The architecture for a User-Centric Access Control for the provided scenario is
depicted in Figure 11.
A user delegates access control functionality for his resources to a component
that is managed by a different entity. Therefore, the user is only concerned with
creating and submitting resources online. Another entity is then responsible for
defining access control rules for those resources.
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Figure 11: User-Centric Access Control in Access Control Delegation Scenario
- Architecture.
2.5.4 Discussion
The following scenario shows how a user can delegate access control functionality
to a different user. In this case, an owner of a resource decides that a different
entity (a custodian) will be responsible for security of their resources. A user
is only concerned with producing and submitting content on the Web and a
custodian is responsible for ensuring that such content is protected. It is up to
the custodian what access control rules will be applied to resources. A Security
Provider in such setting can be viewed as an access control module externalised
from a Web application that is simply under control of a different entity.
View of the actors presented in this scenario with regards to the generic
architecture of a User-Centric Access Control (see Figure 2) is depicted in Fig-
ure 12. Presented diagram shows a Security Provider (1), a User (2), a Web
application (3), Consumers (4) and a Custodian (5).
Figure 12: User-Centric Access Control in access control delegation scenario.
A custodian can be fully responsible for defining access control policies and
may be fully separated from an owner of resources. In such case no direct inter-
actions are needed between an owner of a resource and a custodian who defines
access control policy for this resource. An owner may not have any knowledge
about the security that is applied to a resource. As such, an owner can focus
on main tasks related to producing a resource (e.g. writing a document) and
can leave applying security to those who have greater knowledge about security
requirements that need to be considered.
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Another approach, which has been discussed in the scenario, is where a user
can make an access control policy that is subject to approval by a custodian.
In such setting, two different approaches can be considered. A custodian can
either only restrict the policy further (i.e. the resulting access control policy
can be composed of a subset of rules as proposed by an owner of a resource).
In the second approach, a custodian can define access control policies at his
own discretion. This can mean that a custodian can restrict policies proposed
by an owner of a resource by deleting certain rules, expand those policies by
introducing new rules or change those policies completely. In any case, how
ownership of a resource is preserved needs to be considered.
2.6 Access Control for Internal and External Web Appli-
cations
2.6.1 Introduction
According to a recent survey published by McKinsey [27], majority of organisa-
tions have been using “Web 2.0” applications such as Web services, peer-to-peer
networking, blogs, podcasts, and online social networks. Moreover, a significant
majority plans to increase their investments in “Web 2.0” technologies in coming
years. Among the main incentives is the ability to communicate to customers
and business partners, to increase collaboration inside the company and to man-
age knowledge and share ideas of employees. “Web 2.0” applications are either
developed and deployed internally within organisations or those applications are
used in form of Software-as-a-Service (SaaS).
Applications such as Confluence Wiki Software [2], Wordpress blogging soft-
ware [23] and platform [22], and Google Apps [5] are all used to help businesses
be more competitive and agile on the market and to decrease the cost of their
operation. Those applications have advanced features specifically tailored for
intra-organisational use. The Confluence Wiki provides enterprise-level access
control which allows to define fine-grained access control to Wiki pages. It also
allows to plug in existing Identity Management systems. Wordpress supports
plugins that can extend its core security functionality. Google Apps, which
is provided in form of a service accessible over the Web, allows organisations
to reuse their Identity Management systems as well (e.g. products such as
OpenSSO [21] can be configured with minimum effort to work with Google
Apps).
Even though specialised “Web 2.0” applications are being developed to sup-
port security features as required by organisations, such approach is far from
being perfect. Building applications from scratch for the purpose of adjusting
it to particular requirements of organisations is not desirable. An organisation
may already use its own Access Control Management system and may wish to
reuse its functionality for the SaaS-based applications. Such organisations may
additionally wish to give their employees more flexibility in how access control
rules are defined in order not to decrease the collaborative value of “Web 2.0”
applications.
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In the next section we present how a User-Centric Access Control can be
used to allow organisations plug in their access control management systems
into SaaS-based applications. We show how employees can be empowered to
define access control rules for resources that they wish to share and how those
rules can be constrained by organisational access control policies.
2.6.2 Scenario
Company XYZ is making excellent products and is gaining advantage over its
competitors. With the increased production it is able to cut down its prices.
Additionally, with a high quality of its products, its customer base grows rapidly.
To further increase their sales, decrease the cost of production and extend their
portfolio, the company decides to enhance collaboration with both customers
and foreign designers. It wants to combine professional help from designers with
highly valuable opinions of its customers. By doing that the company wishes to
create a huge knowledge base upon which future ideas can emerge within the
company in a collaborative manner.
In order to build a knowledge base, the company opts to use a Wiki. It
chooses to install the Confluence Wiki to benefit from its enterprise-level func-
tionality and ease of maintenance. Such knowledge base will be accessible by
business partners, customers and employees of the company. To cut the costs
of deployment and the total cost of ownership, the company decides to use such
Wiki as a service and not install it internally.
In order to further support collaboration and collective intelligence of its
employees and other parties, the company decides to allow sharing of short
video clips, presentations and documents. The company wants such multimedia
content to be shared via a fast and reliable service. Therefore, the company
decides to use a dedicated video sharing and online storage services (YouTube
and Office Live Workspace respectively).
In order to be able to define access control rules that would be partly based
on legal and financial considerations, the company chooses to offload access
control from all of the above mentioned applications to a specialised component
- Security Provider. In such setting, the company is able to compose access
control policies internally and apply them to a distributed set of Web resources.
It is able to reuse a magnitude of possible digital identities which may require
access to those resources as well. Moreover, a different entity than the owner of
resources can be responsible for access control for those resources.
In order to allow its employees (users) to compose their access control policies
and still constrain those policies with organisational rules, the company decides
that it will configure each of its Web applications to offload authorisation to
both of the following Security Providers:
1. Employee’s Security Provider - such SP component will allow an employee,
who acts as a user and an owner of resources, to define access control
policies for resources. An employee is believed to have a proper knowledge
about collaboration requirements and can share a resource quicker and in
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many cases more effectively. Access control rules, as defined by employees,
will be subject to restrictions that will be imposed by the Company’s
Security Provider.
2. Company’s Security Provider - such security provider will be configured to
ensure that resources are shared taking legal and financial considerations
into account. Moreover, it will impose constraints on access control rules
specified by employees to prevent data leaks.
The company decides that it will not use external SaaS-based Security
Providers as none of them meets their requirements. It decides to build and
deploy both components in-house. A different Security Provider is used by
company’s IT specialists and a different one is used by employees.
Both Security Providers that are built by the company allow to control a
magnitude of resources hosted by a distributed set of Web applications. IT
Security Specialists are able to define policies based on legal and financial re-
quirements. Such policies are subject to compliance checks. Moreover, IT Se-
curity Specialists are responsible for composing access control policies that will
impose constraints on other security policies. Employees, who act as users of
Web applications, on the other hand, are presented with an intuitive graphi-
cal interface which allows them to define access control policies with minimum
effort. Both security experts and users are able to retrieve information from
multiple distributed Identity Providers when defining access control rules.
All the “Web 2.0” applications that the company decides to use are then
configured to offload its access control functionality to both company’s Security
Providers. Access control decisions are then derived from applicable policies
by those components and are enforced by each Web application. As Security
Providers were developed internally, they are integrated with the company’s
OpenSSO IAM solution. As such, a centrally located set of access control poli-
cies is applied to a distributed set of resources hosted by internal and exter-
nal Web applications. Additionally, the company plugs in its internal Identity
Provider to the entire system.
The collaboration between the company and its business partners and cus-
tomers turns out to be very beneficial. The company is able to manage various
projects easily. Its employees are able to define access control rules by them-
selves which results in a very efficient collaboration. Resources in form of video
clips, presentations and documents can be shared very quickly so that ideas can
be exchanged between distributed parties with minimum effort. Constraints
imposed by the company’s Security Provider prevent any sensitive information
from being leaked from the company. Moreover, they allow any access control
rules that could possibly violate any company’s requirements to be spotted and
prevented very quickly.
The company additionally establishes its own network on Facebook to fur-
ther emphasise its willingness to collaborate with its customers on better de-
signs. Customers are be able to join the network and comment on designs that
are presented to them. Once customers become members of such networks,
they are additionally given access to other resources hosted by other company’s
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Web applications. No account synchronisation is needed as user attributes are
retrieved directly from Facebook. In such setting, the Facebook acts as an Iden-
tity Provider and not as an application as it is only viewed as a source of user
attributes that are later used by other Web applications.
Because both company’s Security Providers are able to retrieve user at-
tributes from various Identity Providers, it is possible to allow business partners
and customers to participate in creating the knowledge base very effectively. No
registration is required from none of the participating parties as already used
identities are sufficient to access company’s set of Web applications.
2.6.3 Architecture
The architecture for a User-Centric Access Control for the provided scenario is
depicted in Figure 13.
Figure 13: User-Centric Access Control in Organisational Access Control Re-
strictions - Architecture.
Web applications can be configured to use multiple Security Providers to
protect the same set of Web resources. When an access request is issued for a
resource then an application contacts those SP components to obtain an autho-
risation decision. Based on the application, its configuration or other factors,
the application may decide which decision is enforced in case decisions from
multiple Security Providers are not consistent or even contradicting. The ap-
plication may also decide to enforce a decision from one Security Provider if it
does not violate any restrictions imposed by a different Security Provider.
2.6.4 Discussion
This scenario presents how a User-Centric Access Control can be used for au-
thorisation of multiple applications hosted within and beyond a single admin-
istrative domain. Web applications offload authorisation to multiple Security
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Providers which are controlled by different entities. Web applications must be
able to resolve conflicts in access control decisions (similarly to an already pre-
sented scenario in Section 2.4). Users with different security knowledge (i.e. IT
Security Specialists vs. Employees) have access to different Security Providers
depending on their skills (see Section 2.3).
View of the actors presented in this scenario with regards to the generic
architecture of a User-Centric Access Control (see Figure 2) is depicted in Figure
14. Presented diagram shows Security Providers (1a,1b), Users (2a,2b), sets of
Web applications (3a,3b), Consumers (4) and Identity Providers (5a,5b).
Figure 14: User-Centric Access Control in Organisational Access Control Re-
strictions Scenario - View of the Actors.
Resources of a single user (e.g. employee) are scattered across multiple Web
applications and security for those resources is controlled by multiple entities. A
user who creates a resource is mostly concerned with how to share this resource.
Such user has the best knowledge about the collaboration requirements (e.g.
what are the other users who should have access to their resources) and is able
to easily define access control rules according to those requirements. Security
for those resources may be subject to additional constraints as imposed by
other entities involved in the security management process (e.g. IT Security
Specialists). As such, Web applications may use multiple Security Providers to
obtain access control decisions which must be enforced.
The scenario presented in this section combines characteristics of some of the
already discussed use case scenarios. Similarly to the use case presented in Sec-
tion 2.4, multiple Security Providers are used for the same set of resources and
the same set of Web applications. Moreover, as already presented in scenario
in Section 2.3, those Security Providers can differ in their functionality and in
the level of flexibility that they provide. Users who create and disseminate in-
formation may use Security Providers with easy-to-use graphical interfaces and
recommenders that support them with policy composition process [30]. Users
who are responsible for security within organisations may use more powerful
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Security Providers.
Apart from combining already presented scenarios, this use case also demon-
strates how a User-Centric Access Control can allow plugging in Identity Providers
from distinct administrative domains and use attributes that come from those
IdP components. As shown in Figure 13, different users of the same Web ap-
plication are allowed to plug in their Security Providers that make use of Iden-
tity Providers from different domains. Attributes obtained from those Identity
Providers are then used when composing access control policies.
An important aspect of the presented approach is the use of social network-
ing applications not as containers for applications or resources but as Identity
Providers. A user is able to establish links (connections) with other users of a
social networking application. Then such user can define access control rules
for various Web applications reusing such connections. A user can either reuse
attributes of single users or connections with those users (Relationship-based
Access Control [32]). An example would be when a user creates a network of
his friends on Facebook and then creates an access control policy on his chosen
Security Provider that allows his friends to view pictures stored by Picasa Web
Albums. Once a friend is added or removed from the list on Facebook, the set
of users able to view pictures stored by Picasa is updated automatically. No
changes are required in the already composed access control policy that is stored
and evaluated by a user’s Security Provider.
2.7 Access Control Using Opaque Tokens and Obligations
2.7.1 Introduction
Existing “Web 2.0” applications are as varied and complex as desktop applica-
tions and meet requirements of even most demanding Internet users. In many
cases, those applications substitute their desktop equivalents and are used by
professionals on a daily basis. For example, Web applications such as Picasa
Web Albums [16] allow photographers to store pictures while applications such
as Picnik [18] allow those pictures to be transformed online. Photographers do
not have to store their pictures on their personal computers but can put them
online and make them easily accessible from various devices. Moreover, they
can make such pictures easily available to a wide audience. By having software
available as a service, they can also work with those pictures without the need
of any software maintenance.
It is often the case, that professionals may want to make profit on the work
that they produce. By hosting it using Web applications they often wish to
achieve two things. The first is that they want to make their work easily acces-
sible and manageable. The second is that they can treat the Web as a potential
channel through which their work could be acquired by interested parties.
Currently, however, it is virtually impossible to integrate popular services
that aid professionals with their work with payment services that would allow
those professionals to make profit. For example, integrating Picasa Web Albums
and PayPal [14] or Google Checkout [6] services cannot be easily achieved. As
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such, if professionals wish to give access to their resources based on received
payments they need to either use specialised services that allow such function-
ality or they need to build custom Web applications which would use APIs of
those payment services.
Conceptually, provisioning a resource based on whether a payment for such
resource has been received does not differ from a typical access control. When
a consumer presents an attribute that the payment has been made then such
attribute is simply treated as a capability (access token) to access this particular
resource. In such setting, the payment service is treated as a trusted party that
issues tokens.
To even further extend possibilities for professional users of the “Web 2.0”
environment additional functionality of access control can be considered - obli-
gations. Even if the integration between a “Web 2.0” application and a pay-
ment service is achieved, handling multiple representations of the same resource
becomes an issue as well. In case a professional wishes that a different represen-
tation of a resource is provisioned based on the type of the payment, they can
upload multiple representations of the same resource. Then each representation
can be accessed when a different token (based on the payment) is presented by
a consumer. This, however, results in multiple copies of the same resource being
hosted by a Web application.
To overcome this problem within the scope of access control, it would be more
efficient to allow uploading a single representation of a resource and provision a
different representation of this resource based on the token that is received by
a service from a consumer. An example of this is when a user uploads a single
picture (e.g. in its highest resolution) to a service. Then, based on the payment
done by a consumer, a different representation of this picture is provisioned (e.g.
the more the consumer pays the better quality picture they can access). This
could be achieved by requiring a resource being processed after an access control
decision is enforced but before a resource is sent to a consumer (e.g. the service
can grant access to a resource but process the picture first by decreasing its
resolution). This shows the necessity of incorporating the notion of obligations
in a User-Centric Access Control.
In the following scenario we present the use of opaque tokens for the access
control decision making process through an example of integrating a Security
Provider with a payment service. Moreover, we show how an obligation service
might be used to allow incorporating obligations in the enforcement process - i.e.
before access to a resource is granted or denied, the enforcement point (a Web
application) needs to fulfil all the obligations as communicated by a Security
Provider.
2.7.2 Scenario
John is a professional photographer. He is very passionate about making photos
in interesting places. It is a common opinion that his pictures are really good
and some perceive them as a masterpiece. John has a huge collection of those
pictures. Some of them are in a digital form while others are in a printed form.
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With the advent of “Web 2.0” John decides to move some of his pictures
to the Web. He wants to share his experience with other photographers and
not only with his close friends and family. Moreover, he wishes to manage his
pictures more easily and more effectively. He also wants to have access to those
pictures wherever he goes. He does not want to carry his computer and photo
albums and he wants to have access to all his pictures using various devices.
Additionally, when he makes new pictures, he wants to upload them directly
to his albums. This is because he does not want to carry redundant electronic
equipment, like his computer, on his often dangerous trips.
John does research on various Web Photo Albums and decides to use Picasa
Web Album [16] because of its intuitive interface. He creates an account on
the service and uploads all his pictures to a newly created Web album. When
he finishes, he notices that he does not have much choice in defining access
control policies for his pictures. He can only make his albums public, non-
public or define Google accounts which would have access to his pictures [17].
Fortunately, Google supports User-Centric Access Control so that John is able
to replace default security mechanisms with his own one.
In order to use his own security mechanism, John finds a very good Security
Provider that meets his requirements. This Security Provider allows to pull
already defined user groups from popular social networking applications such as
Facebook and LinkedIn. This allows John to keep his existing friend networks
and not duplicate them. Moreover, his chosen Security Provider is integrated
with PayPal [14] and Google Checkout [6] payment services. As such, he can
sell pictures directly from Picasa Web Albums.
John configures Picasa Web Albums to use his chosen Security Provider
and defines access control policies at this SP. He makes certain albums public
and accessible for everyone to see. Some albums are restricted only to certain
users. John is able to reuse already established connections with his friends
from Facebook and professionals from LinkedIn. He defines an access control
policy that the pictures should be visible to his friends and professionals. More-
over, he specifies that certain pictures can be accessed only if the consumer of
those pictures makes a payment. He simply specifies such constraints within
access control policies that are composed in a Security Provider. Such Security
Provider is later configured to work with PayPal and Google Checkout payment
services.
John is very concerned with how pictures will be later used by other users
who access those pictures. In particular, he is afraid that those users who pur-
chase his pictures will be able to send them to others with minimum effort. He
knows how good his pictures are and he does not want to lose his business op-
portunity. Therefore, he decides that pictures, before being sent to consumers
(i.e. customers), should have data about those consumers embedded. More-
over, he decides that based on the amount paid for a picture, such picture will
or will not be printable. Both protection mechanisms can be achieved using
technologies similar to DRM (Digital Rights Management).
John finds a very good DRM application which is provided in form of an
easily accessible RESTful Web service. He configures his Security Provider to
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work with this service and introduces necessary changes to his access control
policies. As previously, when a client (customer) requests access to one of John’s
protected pictures, he needs to issue a payment for this picture. However, from
now on, a client has two billing options. If a client chooses the first option
then a picture gets DRM protected before being sent to the client. Such picture
cannot be printed. If a client chooses the second, more expensive, option then a
picture is provisioned to a client with client’s data embedded in the picture. This
discourages a client to send such picture to others. The whole process is fully
transparent to a client which is only concerned with issuing a payment. Once
such payment is issued then a DRM service is given access to the picture. This
service transforms it according to John’s requirements and makes it available to
a client.
2.7.3 Architecture
The architecture for a User-Centric Access Control for the provided scenario is
depicted in Figure 15.
Figure 15: User-Centric Access Control in Access Control for Professionals Sce-
nario - Architecture.
Different Web applications can offload access control decision making process
to a specialised component - a Security Provider. Such decision process is opaque
to those applications which are only concerned with enforcing access control
decisions. It is up to the Security Provider how to derive a decision based on
applicable policies and what information will be used during this process. In
the presented scenario, not an identity but a simple attribute is required by the
Security Provider to make a decision whether access to a resource should be
granted or not.
Additionally, before a resource is provisioned to a consumer, such resource
is consumed by another service (obligation service) which applies obligations as
defined within access control policies. It is the obligation service that makes a
resource available to a client. Further discussion about this approach is given
in the next section.
View of the actors presented in this scenario with regards to the generic ar-
chitecture of a User-Centric Access Control (see Figure 2) is depicted in Figure
16. Presented diagram shows a Security Provider (1), a User (2), a Web appli-
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cation (3), Consumers (4) and additional services (5) that include an obligation
service (6).
Figure 16: User-Centric Access Control in Access Control for Professionals Sce-
nario - View of the Actors.
The additional services, as presented in Figure 16, handle attributes and
obligations. A payment service is responsible for issuing tokens to consumers
who have successfully submitted a payment. Such tokens are then used by
a Security Provider during access control decision making process. A picture
transformation service is used as an obligation service. A Web application uses
this service to fulfil obligations if such are required by a Security Provider.
2.7.4 Discussion
A User-Centric Access Control in this scenario gives the flexibility of defining
various access control policies depending on the exact requirements of the user
of such system. By externalising access control, users are in more control over
what constitutes the access control decision making process. In the presented
scenario, a user is able define that some resources can be read by all consumers.
A user also defines that access to some resources is restricted to a certain group
of users. A user is able to define policies based on identities that come from
different Identity Providers. Moreover, a user is able to define that access should
be granted only when certain attributes are presented. In this case a payment
needs to be done before a resource is provisioned to a user. Therefore, access
control decisions are made not only based on identities of consumers of resources
but based on various (opaque) tokens as well.
Decoupling the system from Identity Management and allowing opaque at-
tributes to be presented as proofs that a user holds a certain capability, allows
to compose flexible and powerful access control policies. A user, who composes
a policy is able to define what attributes need to be presented during the deci-
sion making process to evaluate an access request against an applicable policy.
In such setting, a policy can point to another component that needs to provide
necessary attributes so that an access control decision can be made. Therefore,
the policy can state that either an identity or a simple capability is required.
More abstractly, a Security Provider needs to be able to accept attributes from
various sources as configured by a user of such Security Provider.
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Obligations are an important mechanism in the authorisation system [31].
They allow to define actions which the enforcement point (e.g. Web application)
must perform prior to provisioning a resource to a client. Therefore, obligations
allow to minimise the list of policies that need to be composed. It is possible to
introduce parameterised actions into the policy enforcement stage. In the pre-
sented scenario, a resource needs to be DRM-protected depending on attributes
received by the payment service (which are in fact attributes of a client).
A presented approach of incorporating obligations in a User-Centric Access
Control system differs from the one discussed in [26]. An enforcement point does
not have to adhere to the list of obligations but it is rather the Security Provider
who orchestrates the entire process. Such Security Provider may simply inform
the Web application, which acts as an enforcement point, that the user needs
to be further redirected to a different URL (URL of the obligation service).
Moreover, the Security Provider informs the Web application not to grant access
to a resource by itself. It is rather the obligation service that accesses a resource
(and therefore acts as a consumer of a resource at some point during an access
request is being evaluated by the SP component), performs some operations and
makes a resource available for a client. A resource is made available at a URL
as communicated by a Security Provider.
2.8 Delegating Access Control for Single Resources
2.8.1 Introduction
Accessing bank accounts over the Internet has been considered an efficient and a
convenient way of managing finances by individuals and organisations. An indi-
vidual can easily check balance on their account, make payments or even apply
for a mortgage without leaving the house. To ensure that only legitimate users
are able to access their accounts, very strict authentication mechanisms have
been employed by majority of the banks and finance management applications.
Various applications have been built to support finance management as well.
Web applications, such as Mint [12], Ruder [20] or Quicken [19] allow users to
manage their personal finances easily and effectively. A user must simply setup
an account on one of those websites and create a trust relationship between this
account and a set of bank accounts. Then, a user is able to manage finances,
create reports and compose rich statistics.
Because of the sensitivity of information that is stored by banking systems
and personal finance management applications, authentication and access con-
trol mechanisms are very strict and lack any flexibility in terms of their configu-
ration. Only an owner of an account can log in to this account and perform any
operations on this account. It is impossible to easily configure such accounts so
that certain information is accessible by other users as well.
In certain cases, it is desirable that information hosted by even most sensitive
Web applications, is made available not only to owners of that information.
For example, a person who has an account on a personal finance management
application such as Mint may wish to allow his family members to be aware
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of the balance on his account. Moreover, such person may want to allow some
of his family members to be able to perform certain operations on his account.
This may include making payments up to a certain amount.
In the following scenario we present how a User-Centric Access Control can
be used to allow Web applications delegate access control functionality for a
part of their resources only. A Web application decides which part of resources
hosted by this application can be controlled by a third party component. A
user is then able to configure such Web application to use a Security Provider
of their choice for access control to a part of user’s resources.
2.8.2 Scenario
Josh is very concerned about finances. He is always very strict about the home
budget and stores most of receipts for his own record. He then calculates how
much money his family spends on food or on entertainment. To support his
calculations, Josh decides to set up an account on one of the popular personal
finance management applications. He adds his bank accounts and retrieves
information from those accounts in no time using his new application. He is
then able to make rich statistics and immediately sees how much money is
spent on food and what part of his salary goes to entertainment.
Apart from making rich statistics, his application is able to make payments
as well. Josh decides that he will establish a direct debit to pay for several of
services that his family uses. Moreover, he sees that he can be more flexible in
configuring such payments in comparison to his online banking applications.
Josh decides that he wants his family members to be able to access the bal-
ance on his account in order to adjust their spending to this balance. Moreover,
he wants his wife to be able to make payments that do not exceed a certain
amount. He’s not concerned with what services will be paid for as long as the
amount of payment is lower than 100 Pounds. His finance management applica-
tion allows to expose some of the information to non-owners of the account. As
such, it supports a User-Centric Access Control where access control is delegated
to specialised components - Security Providers.
When Josh logs in to his personal finance management application he is
able to perform various operations by clicking on links on the menu located on
the left side of his application. He is able to check the current balance of his
account, the history of operations or make payments. When Josh clicks on any
of those links he is redirected to a new Web site where the required information
is provided. Everything happens within the scope of the Web application that
Josh accesses, i.e. the balance is displayed as just another page of the entire
Web application.
Josh decides to click on the Check Balance link to check current funds on his
account. He sees that at the bottom of this particular page there is a Personal
Access Control link. The presence of this link means that the Web application
allows users to control access to this particular part of the Web application (i.e.
that a user probably has a better knowledge about how to protect this particular
part of a Web application).
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It is possible to envisage that even high-critical Web applications, such as
personal finance management applications, may allow delegating access control
for some of their non-risky operations (e.g. read only operations). Those appli-
cations will still be responsible for controlling access to all other resources and
operations. An example would be when a Web applications controls access to
all resources by default but allows users to define access control rules for simple
operations such as checking the balance on an account or checking the history
of all performed operations for this account.
When Josh clicks the Personal Access Control link then a configuration Web
page is displayed. If this is the first time Josh clicks on such a link then the
Web application asks Josh to define his required Security Provider. As a finance
management application is a high-critical application then Josh may be asked to
provide two distinct Security Providers of his choice or a single Security Provider
that is particularly trusted by the Web application. An example of the latter
approach would be when certain Security Providers are certified to comply with
high security standards and are therefore considered more trustworthy than
others.
Josh has an account on a Security Provider that is trusted by the personal
finance management application and only needs this single SP component to be
configured. Configuration is very simplified and only requires that a URL of a
Security Provider is given. Then John is redirected to a Security Provider and
must log in to this provider. Then a trust relationship is established between
the Security Provider and a Web application. Josh can now define necessary
access control policies. Those access control policies will then be applied to
protect access to the Check Balance operation.
Josh knows that all his family members have OpenID [13] accounts so that
Josh can easily define necessary policies with minimum effort. The finance
application has already provided his SP component information about the Check
Balance resource and possible operations on this resource. Josh simply creates
a policy that defines that his family members should be able to execute a read
operation on this resource.
Josh performs similar tasks to define access control for the Make payment
resource. Within his Security Provider he defines that his wife Alice should
be able to access this resource. However, Josh decides that he shall impose
additional constraints so that payments can be only done if the amount that is
to be paid does not exceed 100 Pounds.
When all the policies are defined then access control decisions are derived
from those policies by Josh’s Security Provider. Those decisions are enforced
by his personal finance management application. Only Josh can log in to his
account on this application and perform arbitrary operations. His family mem-
bers can check his account balance. Additionally, his wife Alice is able to make
payments if those payments do not exceed 100 Pounds. Every time a Josh’s
family member wishes to perform an operation for which access control is dele-
gated to a Security Provider then the finance management application asks the
SP component for an access control decision.
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2.8.3 Architecture
The architecture for a User-Centric Access Control for the provided scenario is
depicted in Figure 17.
Figure 17: User-Centric Access Control in Finance Application Access Control
Delegation - Architecture.
A single Web application allows a user to offload access control of only a
part of its resources to a Security Provider. All other resources hosted by a
Web application are protected using application’s internal security mechanisms.
2.8.4 Discussion
A use case scenario presented in this section shows that a User-Centric Access
Control can be adopted by Web applications to offload access control functional-
ity for a part of their resources only. Applications do not need to be redesigned
nor they need to resign from their internal access control mechanisms. Those
applications may decide that only a subset of resources hosted by them will be
protected by third party components.
View of the actors presented in this scenario with regards to the generic
architecture of a User-Centric Access Control (see Figure 2) is depicted in Fig-
ure 18. Presented diagram shows a Security Provider (1), a User (2), a Web
application (3), Consumers (4) and a set of resources protected by a Security
Provider (5).
Figure 18: User-Centric Access Control in Finance Application Access Control
Delegation Scenario - View of the Actors.
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In general, a Web application may delegate access control for resources
hosted by this application at three different levels as perceived by users of that
application. First, the application may require that access control is defined
at a third party component (Security Provider) for all resources hosted by this
application. Second, a Web application may require that each user of the ap-
plication may decide whether access to their resources should be provided by
the application or their chosen Security Provider. Third, a user may decide
which resources must be controlled in which way (i.e. access to some resources
may be controlled by the Web application while access to other resources can
be controlled by a Security Provider).
If an entire application delegates access control to a third party component
then advantages are mostly visible from the perspective of a developer of such
application. It is not necessary to implement access control functionality for
an application and simply use the one provided by a Security Provider. Users
must have accounts on a Security Provider that is configured to work with a
Web application.
In a situation where a Web application controls access to its resources by
default but allows each user to delegate access control functionality to a third
party component then users can benefit from security that is tailored to their
particular needs and expectations. A user is able to choose a Security Provider
and plug its functionality to a Web application. Then all resources stored by this
particular user in this Web application are protected by security mechanisms of
a Security Provider.
In case of high-critical Web applications, only a subset of resources hosted by
these applications can be controlled by third party components. Such setting is
the most flexible as it allows each user to choose which Security Provider should
control which resource. Moreover, such setting allows the application to define
which resources can be controlled outside of the application.
2.9 Moving Resources Between Web Applications
2.9.1 Introduction
In a rapidly developing Web environment there is a wide spectrum of various
Web applications that combined together provide users with a powerful set of
features. New interesting Web applications are being offered on a daily basis by
corporations, small start-ups or single developers.
As new applications are being delivered, it is often the case that Web users
wish to test functionality of those applications. Often they decide that a new
application meets their needs and should substitute their old application. Apart
from a better functionality, an application may additionally compete on the price
which plays an important role when choosing which Web application to use.
In a situation where a user decides to switch between two or more Web
applications then resources need to be transferred between those applications.
Most commonly, the user will need to download all resources from an old ap-
plication and upload them to a new one. In some cases, tools are provided to
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support users with this time consuming process. However, security settings and
access control policies need to be manually set up on a new Web application
and cannot be reused from an old one.
When a user wishes to transfer resources from one application to another,
be it manually or automatically, then the problem of access control can be
easily resolved if those applications support User-Centric Access Control. Once
resources are transferred a user may simply plug in their existing and already
configured Security Provider to a new application. Then a user may apply
already composed access control policies for the same set of resources which is
hosted by a new Web application.
In the next section we present how a User-Centric Access Control can be
used to support users when resources are moved between Web application. We
show how our approach allows a user to compose access control policies for
their resources once and apply them independently of Web applications that
host those resources.
2.9.2 Scenario
Caroline is using the Web mostly to share short video clips and pictures of
herself with her friends. She is using YouTube and Picasa Web Albums for
that purpose. She is very happy with those services and is particularly pleased
with their reliability and the fact that those services are free to use for non-
commercial users.
Caroline is very security conscious. She wants all of her video clips and
pictures to be well protected and only accessible by legitimate users (i.e. her
friends). She is fine with spending some time every week to make sure that
access control policies are in place to protect her resources. She is using a Secu-
rity Provider for that purpose. All of her access control policies are composed
centrally and are applied to her resources hosted by YouTube and Picasa.
Apart from pictures and video clips, Caroline stores her documents online as
well. She uses Office Live Workspace as it is integrated with her word processor.
She can access her documents over the Web from almost any place in the world.
She configured Office Live Workspace to delegate access control to her Security
Provider - the same which is used for Picasa and YouTube.
After some time, Caroline decides to use a single Web application to host her
pictures and video clips. However, she does not want to change the Office Live
Workspace application as she finds it very good. Caroline finds a PhotoBucket
service [15]. This Web application allows storing pictures and video clips and
sharing them with other users of the Web.
Caroline reads reviews on the Web and decides to try the PhotoBucket
service. She creates an account on the service. She then configures her Security
Provider to allow PhotoBucket access her resources hosted on YouTube and
Picasa. The PhotoBucket service then acts as a consumer of those resources
and retrieves them. Caroline does not have to be actively involved in that
process and she does not have to download any of her pictures and videos from
YouTube and Picasa and upload them to PhotoBucket by herself.
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The PhotoBucket service supports a User-Centric Access Control so Caroline
configures it to use her already tested Security Provider. By default, all newly
uploaded resources to PhotoBucket are made private. However, Caroline logs
in to this service and clicks on the Administration option. She is then presented
with a menu where she can perform various administration tasks. Among all of
the options she can choose to apply security to all of her resources. Once she
clicks on that option, the PhotoBucket contacts her Security Provider so that
policies can be applied to resources hosted by this application.
Typically, when Caroline defines access control rules for her resources (i.e.
pictures, video clips and documents), she logs in to the application that hosts
those resources and clicks on an Access Control link next to a resource. She
is then redirected to a Security Provider of her choice. Under the hood, the
application contacts the Security Provider with information about the resource
and operations supported by this resource. When Caroline is redirected to her
Security Provider then she sees that it awaits to compose an access control policy
for this resource. She uses the interface of her SP to specify access control rules
that will be later applied to this resource.
In the following case, however, Caroline does not click on the Access Control
link. Instead, she clicks on a link to apply security for all of her resources.
Similarly, she is redirected to her Security Provider and sees that a group of
resources awaits for policies to be specified. Her SP detects that access control
policies were previously applied for those resources and informs Caroline about
that. What she needs to do at this moment is to confirm that those policies can
be reapplied. Once she does that, her resources remain protected in the same
way when those resources were hosted by YouTube and Picasa Web Albums.
2.9.3 Architecture
The architecture for a User-Centric Access Control for the provided scenario is
depicted in Figure 19.
Figure 19: User-Centric Access Control in Moving Resources Between Web
Applications Scenario - Architecture.
A user delegates access control for a set of resources from a Web application
to a Security Provider. If a user decides to move this set of resources from
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one application to another then the same set of policies can be reapplied to
those resources at the new application. Policies stored and evaluated by a
Security Provider are therefore application agnostic. A user is able to define
access control rules to resources independently of the application that hosts
those resources.
View of the actors presented in this scenario with regards to the generic
architecture of a User-Centric Access Control (see Figure 2) is depicted in Figure
20. Presented diagram shows a Security Provider (1), a User (2), a set of Web
applications (3), Consumers (4) and a Resource (5).
Figure 20: User-Centric Access Control in Moving Resources Between Web
Applications Scenario - View of the Actors.
An access control policy protects resources independently of Web applica-
tions. As such, if a resource is moved from one application to another applica-
tion, the same access control policy can be easily reapplied.
2.9.4 Discussion
The following scenario shows how a user is able to reapply already composed
access control policies to resources if those resources are transferred from one
Web application to another Web application. Typically, in such situation it
would be necessary to define access control policies from scratch or to trans-
form policies from one application to the format used by another application.
However, in case of a User-Centric Access Control where policies are stored in
a central location, it is possible to simply apply those policies to the same set
of resources that is hosted by a different Web application.
Reapplying an access control policy to a set of resources does not differ
much from applying a single policy to a resource hosted by a Web application.
Typically, when a user creates a resource on the Web and wants to protect it
then a Web application contacts a Security Provider so that either a new access
control policy can be composed or an already defined policy can be applied.
In a situation where a resource is transferred from one application to another,
the new application perceives such resource as newly created. Therefore, this
new Web application contacts a Security Provider as usual. It is a Security
Provider that detects that a policy for this resource has been previously defined
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and applied. Therefore, this Security Provider proposes to reapply the same
policy to protect this particular resource.
An important issue that needs to be resolved in the discussed use case is
the possibility of having different operations that are supported by different
applications for the same type of resources. An example of that is when one
application allows downloading, writing, deleting and shrinking a picture while
another application allows downloading, writing, deleting and transforming pic-
tures. When an application contacts a Security Provider it sends information
about a resource along with operations supported on this resource. A Security
Provider may detect that a policy has been already specified for such resource
and may propose such policy to be reapplied. However, a set of operations de-
scribed by a new Web application may differ from the set of operations that are
defined in a security policy. This can be either a subset of original operations,
a superset of those operations or a different set of operations.
If a new Web application supports only a subset of operations that were
originally supported by the previous Web application, then rules for those oper-
ations that exist in an access control policy are simply removed. In case a new
application supports a superset of operations then all rules from an access con-
trol policy are retained. New rules for newly supported operations can be easily
added to the policy. In case the set of operations differs from the operations
as defined in an access control policy, a human intervention may be required to
map names of old operations to the names of new operations.
2.10 User Intervention in the Access Control Decision Mak-
ing Process
2.10.1 Introduction
With the increasing amount of applications that easily compete with their desk-
top equivalents, more and more of resources are put online for various purposes.
Data is no longer stored on local machines but is distributed over a set of Web
applications. Such data can be later manipulated by those Web applications.
There are two important issues related to a user’s data being stored online.
First, a single user’s data is scattered across many heterogeneous Web applica-
tions. Second, data that is hosted by one or more of those applications can be
of high significance and sensitivity and needs to be well protected. Therefore,
such data, needs to have more than average access control to be applied to it.
As far as a huge amount of data is concerned, a user needs to provide access
control policies for all of their resources or may leave security settings of each
Web application on its default values. Not configuring security for resources may
not always be the best choice so that a user is typically left with the necessity
of composing access control policies for all of user’s resources that are hosted
by various Web applications. Such policies would allow a user to share those
resources with other users of the Web.
In situations where many different policies need to be configured it is some-
times better to allow a user to evaluate access requests by themselves. Such a
43
user would not be concerned with composing a magnitude of security policies.
Once an access request is issued for an online resource then a user is concerned
with evaluating such access request by themselves and informing a Web applica-
tion about a decision that needs to be enforced. In practice, everything is done
through a Security Provider, which is queried by a Web application to decide on
an access request and subsequently contacts a preconfigured user (in real time)
about a decision for such access request.
In situations where resources hosted by various Web applications are of high
significance, there are different incentives for allowing a human to have an active
role in a an access control decision making process. Those incentives are related
with auditing access requests to such resources. Audit is an important element of
a secure access control system. It allows to log, analyse and notify about various
security related events within a given system. In a User-Centric Access Control
system, auditing functions are centrally located and can be easily accessed by
user. A Security Provider keeps an audit trail of all decisions that have been
derived based on applicable policies and other security events.
To further support access control to sensitive data, audit can be extended so
that a user is presented with a decision that will be made for an access request
before such access request is granted or not. In certain situations a user can be
presented with a description of an access request only and can make a decision
by themselves (with no preconfigured decisions on the SP side). Such user is
then actively involved in an access control decision making process.
2.10.2 Scenario
David is a very known architect. He has his own company and hires a team of
similar-like architects. Most of his team members come from distant part of his
country so that the entire team works remotely most of the time. David and
his colleagues communicate over the Internet or using teleconferences. All com-
pany’s documents, plans, diagrams and other important files are shared using
Web applications - a specialised Storage Service and the Office Live Workspace.
Storing resources online supports David and his company with their work. Hav-
ing virtual meetings and using Web applications to share resources is one of the
reasons why David’s company is so competitive on the market.
Most resources that are hosted by David and his colleagues are of high value
to the company. Very strict and precise access control rules are applied to those
resources. All Web applications that are used by the company to distribute
and manipulate resources (e.g. diagrams and documents) delegate their access
control to David’s Security Provider.
There are certain resources that are of particular value to the company
and David is very worried about their security. Those are some diagrams and
documents that the entire team collaborates on. David is very worried about
changes introduced to those documents by team members. He is also worried
about how some of those documents are accessed by his team members. As the
company owner and a head of the entire team, David decides that he will make
access control decisions for those resources by himself.
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To be able to actively participate in the access control decision making pro-
cess, David configures his company’s Security Provider to issue a query to him-
self and wait for a final access control decision. He then applies this policy to
a set of his most valuable resources hosted by various Web applications. He
additionally defines a simple access control rule to filter those access requests
which are considered highly trusted. This will prevent the Security Provider
from issuing a query to David for every possible access request.
Every time an access request is issued to a resource protected by such an
access control policy, a Security Provider checks whether such access request
should be considered highly trusted. It then either grants such access or sends
a query to David with a description of this request. David then evaluates it,
usually using his common sense and experience, and makes a final access control
decision. Such decision is later enforced by a Web application.
Along with the company’s huge success, the amount of resources being shared
online starts increasing. Some of those resources are accessed infrequently but
are of significant value to the company. Those resources, in form of diagrams
and documents are hosted by multiple different Web applications. David decides
that he needs to protect those resources more efficiently and cannot lose too
much time on composing different access control policies for those resources.
He knows that those resources are not accessed frequently but are typically
requested by a wide spectrum of consumers (his customers). Therefore, he
decides to use the same approach as he uses to protect very sensitive data.
Final access control decisions are therefore made by David who evaluates each
request and informs his Security Provider about the decision. Such decision is
later enforced by a Web application.
In order to apply such policy to infrequently used resources David informs his
colleagues that whenever such resource needs to be protected then they should
apply a specially composed policy to this resource. Such single policy states that
David is involved in the decision making process and must be informed about
every access request. When an access request is issued by a possible consumer of
a resource then David is informed about that and presented with a description
of such request. He can then evaluate such request and make a final decision
that will be enforced by a Web application.
2.10.3 Architecture
The architecture for a User-Centric Access Control for the provided scenario is
depicted in Figure 21.
When a Web application receives an access request to a resource then it
issues an access control decision query to its configured Security Provider. The
Security Provider, however, does not decide whether access should be granted
or not. It issues an access control decision query request to a user who was
configured to receive such a request. Therefore, a user plays an active role in
the decision making process and provides input during this process.
View of the actors presented in this scenario with regards to the generic
architecture of a User-Centric Access Control (see Figure 2) is depicted in Figure
45
Figure 21: User-Centric Access Control in Human Intervention in the Decision
Making Process - Architecture.
22. Presented diagram shows a Security Provider (1), Users (2a,2b), a set of
Web applications (3) and Consumers (4).
Figure 22: User-Centric Access Control in Human Intervention in the Decision
Making Process - View of the Actors.
An access control decision making process is distributed over a Security
Provider (1) and one of the users (2a).
2.10.4 Discussion
A User-Centric Access Control in this scenario shows how a user is able to
offload access control from their chosen set of Web applications to a specialised
component which later can offload the decision making process (or just a part
of it) to a user. In such setting the decision making process is distributed over
a Security Provider and a user (or a set of users).
A human intervention during the decision making process can be twofold.
First, a Security Provider can inform a user (i.e. owner of a resource or a cus-
todian responsible for security of a resource) that an access request has been
issued to a resource and that a decision needs to be made. A user, for example,
can be presented with a list of possible options (i.e. grant, deny, apply obli-
46
gations, etc.) and must choose between those options. Second, a user can be
informed that an access request has been issued and what is the decision that
will be derived from an applicable policy. A user may then have a chance to
change the decision within a given time period. If a user does not change a
decision then a Security Provider informs a Web application about the decision
that has been derived from an applicable policy. Otherwise, a Web application
receives a decision that has been made by a human being.
It is possible that a consumer of a resource will get information that his
access request is currently under evaluation and he will be informed once a
resource is accessible (or not). Such communication is therefore asynchronous
as the consumer does not have to wait to get a reply back. A user, owner of
a resource or custodian responsible for its security, gets information about an
access request that needs to be evaluated. It is important to note that how a
user is informed that his intervention is required can be application specific. An
example would be when a user gets an email with a described access request and
is asked about the decision. Similar approach has been already used in Social
Networks where a user needs to click on a link sent to their email address to
confirm that they wish to allow other user of a social networking application to
join their network. Moreover, how a consumer is informed that his access request
has been evaluated can be application specific as well. One of the approaches
would be to send an email to the consumer of a resource. Such email would
contain a link to a resource if the decision was to grant access to this resource
or information that such access is denied.
A human intervention can be additionally used in a setting where a single
Security Provider is used for evaluating access requests to resources but a final
decision that needs to be enforced by a Web application must be based on
information from multiple sources. This can be used when multiple parties
should be able to influence the decision making process and should provide
their input (e.g. their decision) into the entire process. An example would be
when a Web application contacts a Security Provider for the decision for an
access request and a Security Provider contacts multiple preconfigured users
for their decision for this particular access request. All such users are then
contacted and must respond with their decision. Then a final decision needs to
be made based on the provided input. Such decision can be based on majority
of decisions as received from users. Moreover, it can be derived from decisions
of all users but constrained by decisions received from a certain group of users
(e.g. more privileged users). Another approach would be when a final decision
is the one which is preconfigured in case not all decisions received from users
are the same.
3 Summary
User-Centric Access Control fits precisely in the highly collaborative ”Web 2.0”
environment. In our approach users do not lose the ability to easily create and
share content using various Web applications and are additionally empowered
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to flexibly control access to their increasing amount of online resources. In our
system, security requirements are expressed in access control policies. Such poli-
cies can be composed in preferred security languages and stored at specialised
components (Security Providers). Access control rules are then applied to dis-
tributed resources hosted by various Web applications. Users can easily manage
permissions to data irrespectively of Web applications that host this data and
have a consolidated view of the applied security mechanisms.
In this paper we presented a set of use case scenarios where we find our User-
Centric Access Control to be particularly well suited. We discussed those use
case scenarios from the perspective of individuals and organisations that make
use of Web applications and are concerned with security management for their
resources hosted by those applications. We presented examples of architectures
that could provide the required functionality of each scenario. Additionally, we
discussed challenges and problems that exist in each scenario and should be
considered in more details.
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